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ABSTRACT
Banks know more about the quality of their assets than do outside
investors. This informational asymmetry can distort investment decisions if
the bank must raise funds from uninformed outsiders, and assets sold will be
subject to a lemons discount. Using a three-period equilibrium model we
examine the effect of asymmetric information about loan quality on the asset
and liability decisions of banks and the market valuation of bank
liabilities. The existence of a precautionary demand for T-bills against
future liquidity needs depends both on the regulatory environment and the
informational structure. If banks are ex ante identical, issuing risky debt
to fund a deposit outflow is preferred to holding T-bills ex ante. However,
if banks have partial knowledge of loan quality, and if their asset choice is
observable, they may hold T-bills to signal their quality, enabling them to
issue risky debt at a lower interest rate.
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Many firms know more about the quality of their assets than do outside
investors. This informational asymmetry can distort investment decisions if
the firm must raise funds from uninformed outsiders (Myers and Majiuf, 1984).
Banks appear particularly vulnerable to these information problems; private
information about loan quality is usually obtained as part of the lending
process.1 In this paper we consider the effect of asymmetric information
about loan quality on the asset and liability decisions of banks, and the
market valuation of bank liabilities.Bank incentives differ from those of
most other firms for two key reasons in this model:
1. banks receive non-risk-based deposit insurance, and
2. banks provide liquidity services for depositors, resulting in
stochastic cash outflows.
It is well known that deposit insurance creates an incentive to increase
risk (Merton, 1977). With symmetric information and costless asset sales, a
risk-neutral bank would minimize equity holdings and invest in the riskiest
available assets, which we call loans, to maximize the option value of the
insurance. It is not obvious, however, whether in practice banks actively
enhance or decrease risk. The fact that banks keep a significant proportion
of their portfolio in low-risk government securities suggests risk avoidance.
On the other hand, banks set equity close to the regulatory minimum, and off-
balance-sheet activities such as back-up lines of credit may be undertaken to
increase risk (Andrews and Sender).2 Previous studies attribute bank risk
aversion to a variety of factors: regulatory incentives (Flannery, 1987),
risk averse owners or managers (Hart and Jaffee, 1974; Koehn and Santomero,
1980), protection of charter value (Marcus, 1984; Merton, 1979), and2
exogenous costs of selling loans (Poole, 1968; Frost, 1971; Baltensperger,
1974).
We suggest that asymmetric information about asset quality coupled with
an uncertain need for liquidity may induce a demand for low-risk securities,
despite FDIC insurance. Suppose that a bank with good quality loans suffers
a large deposit outflow. Banks have several funding alternatives, including
sales of loans, and issuing uninsured debt. If the bank sells its good
quality loans, it will be able to do so only at a discount, since the
presence of asymmetric information gives rise to a lemons market for loans
(Akerlof, 1970), in which loans sell at a discount from their average value.
For the bank which knows that it has good loans, selling at a discount is a
cost of loan sales. By the same token, if the bank issues a risky security
such as equity or uninsured debt, there is also a lemons cost, since the
security purchaser must contend with the possibility that the security is
being issued by a poor quality bank (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Since lemons pricing is potentially costly, one might expect banks to
take precautions against having to sell risky loans or issue debt. This is
similar to the idea that corporations with private information about asset
quality will hold financial slack to avoid more costly security issues (John
and Nachman, 1987). One such precaution is for banks to hold publicly traded
securities about which there is symmetric information and hence no discount
in the resale market.3 One cannot conclude, however, that securities or some
other form of financial slack will be used to circumvent information
problems. In fact we show that in many cases even with private information,
it is optimal to hold only risky assets to maximize the value of deposit
insurance. The reason is that the lemons cost, while it may be a cost to the3
relatively good banks ex post, is not necessarily a cost ex ante. In the
absence of FDIC insurance, for example, we show that if all banks are ex ante
identical, banks will not pay anything to avoid bearing the lemons cost. The
reason is simply that if the market sets the lemons discount based on
rational expectations about the distribution of loans which will be sold,
then banks on average are neither helped nor hurt by selling lemons loans or
securities, so ex ante banks will take no steps to reduce the probability of
entering a lemons market. The presence of the FDIC changes this conclusion,
however, and the lemons discount can then be costly ex ante to banks as a
group.
The model answers a number questions about optimal bank behavior in the
presence of asymmetric information. Under what circumstances will insured
banks hold risk-free securities to avoid liquidity costs? How are bank debt
and secondary market loans priced? Is there a limit on the amount of
uninsured debt that banks can profitably issue? Does issuing debt dominate
loan sales as a means of attaining liquidity? Can banks with good loans
credibly signal their asset quality?
We address these issues in a three period equilibrium model. The
results depend critically on whether or not banks have ex ante private
information about loan quality, so we consider both cases. In each case, a
signalling game (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984) between outside investors and
banks determines the price and quantity of uninsured bank debt.
Section II sets up Model I, in which banks are identical at the time
that they select their initial portfolio. Subsequently each receives a
private signal that reveals loan quality and a deposit realization. If there
is a withdrawal and banks have insufficient liquidity to meet it, either debt4
must be issued or loans sold. In Sections III and IV the solution to a
signalling game determines the equilibrium price and quantity of debt in
Model I, and the discount on loan sales is derived. We find that if issuing
debt is prohibited, banks may have a precautionary demand for securities to
avoid costly loan sales. However, when debt issuance in period 1 is a
possibility, in equilibrium banks prefer to issue debt when the need for
liquidity arises, rather than holding precautionary securities ex ante.
Generally there is a partial pooling equilibrium in the debt market, in which
banks with poor loans borrow at the expense of banks with good loans and
withdrawals. The amount of borrowing in equilibrium is never more than that
necessary for banks to avoid liquidating good loans. Banks with good loans
always prefer borrowing to selling loans.
An obvious question is whether these results change when banks have
private information at the time they make incremental portfolio decisions.
Section V studies the case in which banks have old loans of privately known
quality at the time they decide whether to invest new funds in loans or in
riskiess securities. In this case the quantity of securities chosen can
signal the quality of existing bank loans, and hence affects the interest
rate at which debt may be issued in subsequent periods. Conditions for the
existence of a signalling equilibrium are derived, and examples are
calculated. Section VI concludes.
II. Model I: Banks Ex Ante Identical
a. Basic Structure
We consider first the case where banks are ex ante identical, but
subsequently receive private information about loan quality and liquidity5
needs. Banks operate for three periods. This provides an initial investment
period, a period in which actions are taken based on private information, and
a final period in which all information becomes public. This is the minimal
number of periods in which to study the role of asymmetric information. To
begin we describe the cash flows, decision variables, and constraints in each
period.
Period 0:
At time 0 all banks are identical. Each receives an exogenous, insured
deposit inflow D0. The capital requirement is a fractionof assets,
implying that initial equity must be at least £(S0÷L0). We assume that banks
initially set equity to this minimum level. Banks optimally divide the funds
raised from equity and deposits between two-period loans, L0, and two-period
securities, S0. This implies that
—
S0+L
Securities earn the risk-free rate r in both periods 1 and 2, and all
principal is repaid in period 2. Loans made in period 0 return L0(° +
inperiod 1, and return L0(l -*)(l+O)in period 2. is the promised
repayment of principal, anda° is a random interest payment or default
amount.4 For a given loan, a is the same in periods 1 and 2. For
tractability, loan returns a are binomial, with probability f of a high
return H' and probability (1-f) of a low return aL. The time superscript
will be suppressed when there is no ambiguity. Loans are actuarially fair:
(1) (l+r) — +6
Period 1:
Between periods 0 and 1, the bank receives two new pieces of
information. First, the bank learns the quality of period 0 loans, so
uncertainty is resolved about ao.5 Banks also learn whether a deposit or
withdrawal will be made in period 1. Deposits are binomially distributed,
with probability g of a withdrawal and probability (l-.g) of a deposit 8L
By convention a positive & denotes a withdrawal.
The bank must return any deposits demanded, and pay interest on old
deposits. This outflow can be funded by sales of old securities, sales of
existing loans, Q0, or issuing debt, B. Since securities S0 are risk-free,
they can be sold at face value. Two period securities, then, are
"informationally matched" with one period deposits. If loans, Q0, are sold,
the bank receives Q0(1-c), where c is the (endogenously determined) discount
due to the information asymmetry.
If the net cash inflow, including funds raised from loan sales and
security sales, is positive, then the bank invests the cash in new risky,
one-period loans L1. Because all remaining uncertainty is resolved in period
2, it is optimal because of FDIC insurance for cash which is not used to fund
deposit outflows to be invested in these new loans, and for all old
securities to be sold.6 Dividends, which are an alternative use of free
cash, are ruled out for tractability.7
We assume that the market does not learn the quantity of new L1 loans
until period 2, since this would be sufficient to infer The period 2
return on L1 is distributed independently and identically to the return on7
L0. Since dividends are zero by assumption, all period 1 cash inflows are






All terms except 8 and c are non-negative, and Q0 ￿L0(l-*0).We define
financial slack in period 1, A, as net funds available from period 0 for
investment or to fund deposit outflows. Securities S0 are included because
they can be sold costlessly at time 1. Note that banks with good loans have
more slack because a is greater.
Period 2:
In the final period no choices remain. Loans pay off interest and
principal, and depositors and debt-holders must be repaid if possible.
Equity-holders receive the net cash flow if it is positive, and nothing if
liabilities exceed assets. The total value of equity in period 2 is
(3) max [0, (L0(l-°)-Q0)(l+a0) +L1(l+a1)
-(D0-6)(l+r)
-(l+r+s)B]
where r+s is the promised rate on bank debt.
III. Equilibrium in the Debt and Used Loan Markets
A. ExDected Profit in Period 1
Before determining the period 0 portfolio, it is necessary to derive the
equilibrium price and quantity of debt issued and loans sold in period 1,
conditional on L0 and S0. We solve for the equilibrium price and quantity of8
subordinated bank debt by setting up a signalling game between banks and
investors. For tractability, we consider only subordinated debt. A similar
analysis could be applied to straight debt or equity.9
Substituting (2) into (3), in period 1 banks choose B and Q0 to maximize




E1 denotes the expectation operator, conditional on all informationavailable
at the beginning of period 1. is the discount factor, with 8=(l+r)1.
Because of the distributions of returns and withdrawals, there are four
types of banks in period 1: a) "good/good" banks with good loans and deposit
inflows, b) "good/bad" banks with good loans and deposit outflows, c)
"bad/good" banks with bad loans and deposit inflows, and d) "bad/bad" banks
with bad loans and deposit outflows. Expected profit differs for each type,
and affects their choices of Q0 and B.
The pricing of bank securities is complicated by differential default
probabilities and payoffs to security holders across the various types of
banks. With private information, the different types of banks have different
incentives to issue debt and sell loans. Banks with good loans want to avoid
discount sales, while banks with bad loans benefit from portfolio churning to
increase their portfolio risk. One might expect the debt market to be driven
out by the presence of asymmetric information. However, a bank with good
loans and deposit outflows (a "good/bad" bank), is willing to pay a premium
when issuing securities in order to avoid selling good loans at a discount.
This premium creates a potential rent for other market participants. In9
particular, if risky banks can pooi with these good/bad banks, they can issue
debt or sell loans at a favorable price. On the other hand, it may be
possible for the good/bad banks to distinguish themselves by the amount they
choose to borrow, and avoid paying a premium over the fair price. Here we
describe more fully the incentives for each type:
Good/bads
The good/bads have less financial slack than deposit outflows, so loans
must be sold or debt issued. The amount of loans that must be sold is given
by:
(5) Q0 —max[O,
It will be shown in Lemma 2 below that in equilibrium subordinated debt
issues never exceed that necessary to avoid loan sales, so that
min{O, SHAHB] =0whenever B >0.This is because for larger amounts of
debt the information asymmetry continues to create a lemons problem, but
there are no more potential offsetting gains from avoided forced loan sales.
After meeting the deposit outflow the good/bad bank has no uninvested
cash, so no new loans are purchased. Thus there is no uncertainty about
returns in period 2. Evaluating (4) at and 66L' the total benefit from
borrowing to avoid loan sales is B(l+aH)/(lc) -B(l+r+s).This benefit
increases with the discount c, and decreases with the premium s on debt.
Good/goods
Good/goods have cash from deposit inflows to invest in new loans. It is
clear that they will never choose to sell good loans at a discount in order
to buy new risky loans. Whether or not they borrow depends on the premium s,10
and whether they are risky. Good/goods are risky if in the event that their
new loans are bad they go bankrupt. If they have relatively few new loans,
the above average returns from the old loans assure solvency. If good/goods
are riskfree, the expected return on new loans is 1+r, so borrowing is zero
for a premium s>0. If good/goods are risky, the payoff in period 2 from
borrowing conditional on solvency, is (l4a)B(1+r+s)B.
Bad/goods and Bad/bads
Banks with bad loans always prefer to sell them and use the proceeds to
invest in risky new loans. This follows from the fact that the equilibrium
secondary market price for loans will be at least as great as the true value
of the bad loans, and higher if some good loans are also sold. Even if the
price were slightly less than fair, bad banks would prefer to liquidate old
loans and buy new loans because this increases risk in the final period.
Since we assume that loan sales are unobservable, they have no adverse affect
on the ability of bad banks to mimic the good banks in the debt market.
Banks with bad L0 loans generally need to buy new risky loans in order
to have any chance of solvency in period 2. Since the bad/bads can borrow no
more than the good/bads, and the good/bads only borrow to avoid loan sales,
the bad/bads cannot borrow enough to avoid certain bankruptcy. We assume
that when they are bankrupt for certain, the bad/bads sell all their loans in
the secondary market in period 1, and wait until period 2 to go bankrupt.
This assumption has a negligible affect on the results.
B. Determination of the Lemons Discount for Loan Sales
The informational asymmetry about loan quality implies that old loans
sell at a discount c from face value)° The value of c depends on investors'11
beliefs about the quality of loans being sold. Risk-neutral, competitive
investors will accept a discount that provides an expected return of r.
Let E(a) denote an investor's expectation about the return on a loan
purchased in the secondary market. Then to receive an expected return of at
least r, c must satisfy:
(6) (1-c)(l+r)( l+E(a))
Ifthe quantity of loans sold were observable, this expectation would be
conditioned on quantity.1
Lemma 1: The discount c is positive when the quantity of loans sold is
unobservable and loan sales are anonymous.
Proof: Since all banks with bad loans sell them, at least a fraction (1-f)
of used loans have a return of aL. If in addition all banks with good loans
were to sell all loans, then from (6) c —0and c is at a minimum. But for
c—0, good/good banks will not voluntarily sell any loans, so c is Positive.//
C. Debt Market Equilibrium
In this section the quantity and promised interest payment on debt is
found by solving a signalling game between banks and investors in period 1.
C.l.Structureof the Game
The objective function of all players, distributions of loan quality and
deposit flows, and structure of the game is common knowledge. Banks know
their own type, but competitive investors observe neither loan quality,12
quantity of loan sales or new loan purchases, nor deposit realizations. We
assume that if a bank is indifferent about borrowing, it won't borrow.
The game proceeds as follows: A bank approaches an investor with an
offer (B,s), where B is the desired quantity to be borrowed, and s is the
premium over the risk-free rate promised on B. Investors either accept or
reject the offer with a response R€(yes,no). If the bank is solvent in
period 2 the investor receives (1+r+s)B. Otherwise the investor receives the
liquidated value of the bank net of the amount owed to the FDIC. Only pure
strategies are considered.
Definition of Equilibrium: [(B*,s*),R*J is an equilibrium offer/response
pair if and only if
(a) fl.(B,s) ￿ fl.(B*,s*) 1 1
for any other offer (B,s), where II. is expected profits for a bank of type i,
and
(b) Investors accept any offer yielding non-negative expected profits.
Locating equilibria requires several preliminary steps. Two types of
schedules are derived to generate candidate equilibria. The first gives the
reservation rate levels above which a bank of a particular type would not
borrow. The second provides a rate schedule yielding zero expected profits
to the investor for a particular combination of types borrowing. Together,
these schedules define a set of interest rates and quantities for which banks
willingly lend and investors willingly borrow. This set is the candidate
schedule. Theorem 1 establishes that the equilibria are points on this
candidate schedule that maximize the profits of a good/bad bank. Thus if13
there is a unique profit-maximizing offer for the good/bads, there is a
unique equilibrium.
C.2. Derivation of Borrowing Reservation Schedules for Banks
Define reservation rates E(B) to be the maximum markup over the risk-
free rate at which type i would willingly borrow B rather than borrow
nothing. The expected profit function, equation (4), depends on B and s and
can be written as 1I(B,s). Solving fl.(B,s)—fl.(O,O) for s as a function of B
yields the reservation schedules E(B). As discussed above, the reservation
rate for a given level of borrowing depends on whether the bank is risky at
that level of borrowing. The appendix gives E and
Ebgexplicitly)2
C.3. Derivation of Fair Lending Schedules for Investors
Investors are competitive and risk neutral, so they are willing to lend
at any rate that yields non-negative expected profits. The pooling schedules
provide the markup over the riskfree rate for which investors will be fairly
compensated if those types assumed to borrow B always do so.
The derivation of the pooling schedule is given in detail here only for
the case in which good/goods and good/bads borrow, and for which good/bads
are riskfree. The other schedules can be found similarly. If only
good/goods and good/bads offer (B,s), then the probability of being
approached by a good/bad making this offer is w1 —fg/(fg-1-f(1-g))—g,and
the probability of a good/good is w2 —1-w1
—l-g.
Suppose that banks offer to borrow at a rate r÷s*. For the investor to





The first term on the right is the sure repayment from the riskiess
good/bads, while the second term reflects a full repayment from the
good/goods if new loans are good and a partial repayment otherwise. Solving
for s*:
I (l-f)w2[(1+r) -x/B]/(w1+w2f) if good/goods risky
(8) s*
10 if good/goods riskfree
where x —max(0,
Lemma 2 establishes that the only relevant pooling schedules include the
good/ba.ds, because the other types would never choose to borrow at a fair
pooling rate.
Lemma 2: A pool of banks not including the good/bads never would issue
subordinated debt at a fair rate to lenders. A good/bad bank never will
issue more than enough subordinated debt to avoid loan liquidations.
(proof in appendix)
D. Determination of Equilibria
Combining the information in the schedules and pooling schedules
provides the set of candidate equilibria.
Definition: The set of candidate equilibria are all offer pairs (B,s) with
the following properties: (pl) if all banks making positive profits with this15
offer were to make this offer, investors expectations about expected returns
would be satisfied, and (p2) For a given B, s is the minimal premium so that
(p1) holds.
The bold line in Figure 1 gives an example of this set for the case when
bad/goods are bankrupt without borrowing, and good/goods are risky without
borrowing. Recall that the E(B) schedules give the premiums above which
type i would not choose to borrow, and the s(.) schedules give rate premiums
below which investors would not lend. From Figure 1, it is clear that on [K,
all three types borrow along the s(gb,gg,bg) schedule. For B on
[J,K], s(gb,gg,bg) lies above the reservation level for bad/goods, so a
three-pool is impossible. On this segment any offer on Eg just prevents the
bad/goods from borrowing, and good/goods and good/bads pooi. Note that
investors make positive profits in this region, since there is no equilibrium
offer that yields zero profits. Below J, only good/goods and good/bads are
willing to borrow at the fair pooling price for these two types, so the
candidate schedule follows s(gb,gg).
Most of the points on the bold line in Figure 1 are not equilibria,
because a good/bad bank would never choose these offers in equilibrium.
Theorem 1 characterizes the equilibria.
Theorem 1: An equilibrium of the borrowing game is any point along the
candidate schedule that maximizes the expected profits of the good/bads. The








Proof: If all banks who borrow make the same offer, these offers must lie on
the candidate set. This is because banks know that investors will accept any
offer with non-negative profits, and these are the minimum offers consistent
with non-negative profits for investors and profit maximizing behavior by
banks, by definition of the candidate schedule. The good/bads can borrow at
the risk-free rate if they can reveal their type, and would like to do so.
Thus they are unconstrained in choosing a profit-maximizing offer. It
remains to show that all borrowing banks make the same offer.
Suppose that expected profit-maximizing offers were to differ across
types. Then investors could identify at least one type or subpool not
including the good/bads. They would only lend to this subgroup at a rate
yielding a fair return. By Lemma 2, banks would be unwilling to borrow at
this rate. Thus banks either borrow at the profit-maximizing level for
good/bads or don't borrow.
We have not discussed beliefs about out-of-equilibrium offers. Note
that if investors believe all out-of-equilibrium offers come from banks with
bad loans, then no bank with good loans will have the incentive to make this
offer and the belief will be self-fulfilling.,
Note that although we do not prove the necessity of a unique
equilibrium, all simulations generated a unique equilibrium.
IV.Implicationsfor Period 0 Asset Choice
In the foregoing, we determined equilibrium loan sales and subordinated
debt issues taking as given the initial portfolio of loans and securities.17
In this section we examine the optimal period 0 division between loans and
securities for a wide set of parameters by simulation.
It is a complicated but well-defined problem to consider all possible
levels of time 0 security holdings and find ex ante expected profits with
borrowing determined as in Theorem 1. Then the optimal division of original
deposits between securities and loans is that which maximizes ex ante
expected profits.
An algorithm for locating maximum expected profits is the following.
Fix a discount c. Divide initial deposits in varying proportions between S0
and L0. For a given allocation, find the amount of borrowing and loan sales
for each type by solving the borrowing game. Note that lenders in period 1
can observe S0 and L0, so borrowing opportunities for banks are conditional
on this choice. In particular, lenders will not lend more than the maximum
amount that a good/bad could conceivably need to borrow to avoid selling good
loans. At the initial allocation that maximizes expected profit, c is
recalculated to be fair to purchasers of used loans (eq. (6)). This is
repeated until a fixed point in c is located. The treatment of c is
consistent with the assumption that banks take c as exogenous.
Numerical implementation of this algorithm established that for a wide
set of parameter values:
1) Banks prefer borrowing to holding precautionary securities; when
borrowing is possible banks optimally hold no securities.
2) Banks with good loans never sell loans for liquidity purposes when
there is the opportunity to borrow.
In order to interpret these results, we look more closely at banks'
incentives in several special cases in the next section.18
A. Portfolio Choice Without Borrowing. and the Role of the FDIC
To understand the effect on bank asset choice of the ability to issue
debt, it is useful to examine the bank's period 0 portfolio choice when debt
issues in period 1 are not permitted. Intuition suggests that some
precautionary security holdings may be optimal to avoid costly loan sales in
period 1. However, depending on parameter values, it is possible that banks
will hold no securities or 100% securities. Simulations of the model suggest
that for most parameterizations, banks hold only loans, although some
precautionary security holdings appear to be optimal when a) the lemons
discount is high, and b) there are a relatively large number of good/bad
banks.
The result that banks may hold only risk-free securities in period 0 is
somewhat surprising, but easily explainable. Suppose banks know that there
will be a net inflow of period 1 deposits, so that avoidance of forced loan
sales no longer motivates security holdings. Also assume that enough new
loans can be purchased in period 1 so that failure in period 2 is determined
entirely by the return on loans made in period 1, and is therefore unaffected
by L0 loan quality. The marginal benefit from investing in securities in
period 0 is f(l+H)(l+r), while that from investing in loans in period 0is13
f(l+aH)[f(l+aH) +(lf)(aL+(1-c))]—
Thisis less than the return from securities by cf(l-f)(l+a11). Thus, if
solvency depends only on loan quality and there are no withdrawals, banks
invest only in securities. Paradoxically, in this case securities increase19
risk. Because the returns on period 0 and period 1 loans are independent, by
holding loans in period 0 the bank diversifies intertemporally, which lowers
the value of FDIC insurance.
Suppose on the other hand that the return on period 0 loans does affect
the ultimate probability of bankruptcy, and that it is necessary that the
bank have high returns on both period 0 and period 1 loans to be solvent in
period 2. Again assume the probability of a deposit outflow is zero. The
marginal benefit to investing in securities instead of loans is
f2[(1+aH)(l+r) -(1+a11)2}
< 0
so it is optimal for the bank to invest solely in loans in period 0.
Thus, if deposit outflows are negligible and current portfolio decisions
will not affect the ultimate probability of bankruptcy, a bank will wait and
place all its bets in one period. If current portfolio decisions affect the
ultimate probability of bankruptcy, it is optimal to invest in risky assets
in each period. This suggests that banks which expect to grow rapidly will
have less risky asset portfolios, even with FDIC insurance.
The foregoing explains the case of no or few forced sales of loans in
the presence of FDIC insurance. We now consider the effect of removing FDIC
insurance, and reintroduce the possibility of forced loan sales. Is it
possible in this case that banks will have a precautionary motive for holding
securities? Lemma 3 establishes that there is no precautionary motive
without insurance.20
Lemma 3: In the absence of FDIC insurance, if banks have no private
information in period 0, and if the lemons price in period 1 is actuarially
fair, then banks are indifferent about period 0 asset composition and their
debt-equity ratio.
(proof in appendix)
This result implies that the existence of a lemons market for loans in
period 1 does not in itself provide a precautionary motive for holding
securities. If the price received for liquidated loans is fair conditional
on no information, then the prospect of entering a lemons market provides no
precautionary motive.
Why can FDIC insurance generate a precautionary demand for securities?
In period 2, the FDIC will own the banks with the worst loans, while solvent
banks will own more than the ex ante average amount of good loans. To the
extent that solvent banks in equilibrium will sell more high quality loans
than the bad banks ultimately owned by the FDIC, c is no longer ex ante fair
to banks as a group. Thus, banks may hold securities to avoid pooling with
the FDIC in the used loan market.
B. Portfolio Choice With Borrowing in Period 1
We have established that with FDIC insurance, there exist cases for
which banks in Model I have a precautionary demand for securities. This case
is the relevant benchmark for the analysis that follows. The question is
whether securities still dominate loans when issuing debt is an alternative
to loan sales to raise liquidity.21
To answer this question, simulation parameter values were varied over
those for which positive security holdings are optimal when borrowing is
prohibited. A grid search located this region of parameter space (see Table
1 in the appendix). In this region, optimal security holdings are
approximately 15% when borrowing is prohibited.
In all cases the ability to borrow drives out security holdings,
although good/bad banks always pay a premium on debt in equilibrium.
Furthermore, no good loans are sold. It is not surprising that borrowing
dominates loan sales. Selling loans has the worst pooling properties for the
good/bad banks, since all bad loans are sold on the secondary market, driving
up c. It appears that borrowing crowds out security holdings because to a
first approximation borrowing is zero sum across banks, because while the
good banks borrow at a premium, the poorer banks borrow at a discount.
However security holdings unambiguously reduce the aggregate value of FDIC
insurance for these parameters.
V. The Effect of Prior Information About Loan Quality
The foregoing suggests that shielding loans from forced discount sales
does not explain bank security holdings when alternative financing is
available in this model. However, this result can be reversed with slightly
different, and arguably more realistic, informational assumptions. We now
ask what happens when banks have information about the quality of existing
loans before having to decide whether to hold securities or loans. In this
case securities can serve as a signal of bank quality, and will be purchased
in equilibrium.22
A. A SimDle Exanrnle
Banks generally have a substantial number of old loans on their books
when making a new investment decision. Information about the quality of
these loans can affect investment decisions and borrowing costs. In this
section Model I is modified to include old loans of known quality, and we
demonstrate the existence of signalling equilibria in which the quantity of
securities held reveals the quality of old loans.
It is well known that a necessary condition for a signalling equilibrium
is that high quality types have a lower cost of taking a costly action than
low quality types. When banks have information about the quality of existing
loans, it tends to be less costly for banks with good loans to hold
securities. This is because bad banks need risky assets to have any chance
of solvency, while many good banks may be locally riskfree, and thus
indifferent between loans and securities. Good banks also may want to buffer
their good loans against discount sales. If by holding securities good banks
can distinguish themselves to outside investors, holding securities will
lower borrowing costs. Good banks compare the gains from lowering expected
borrowing costs against the loss in value of FDIC insurance from holding
enough riskless securities to prevent bad banks from mimicking.
A simple algebraic example illustrates this logic. Imagine that in
period 0 all banks have old loans, L1 of known quality, which will pay back
(1+a1)2 times the principal in period 2, where a1 isaH or aL. These loans
are backed by deposits D1. In period 0, new deposits D0 arrive, and can be
used to buy securities or loans. Consider a bank with low quality old loans.
If it does nothing or uses the new deposits for securities only, it will have23
a deficit in period 2 of D01(l+r)2 -Ll(l+aL)2.However, by investing
deposits in risky loans recovery is possible as long as
Ll(l+aL)2 + - (D1+D0)(l+r)2>0
If banks with existing good loans hold securities, then banks with bad loans
must also hold securities between periods 0 and 1 if they want to borrow at
the pooling rate in period 1. However, doing so means foregoing the
possibility of higher interest on loans than on securities for the period,
which may outweigh the benefit from borrowing. Let Sg be the quantity of
securities held by good banks, and B be the amount that can be borrowed in
period 1. Then the payoff to a bad bank that mimics is





This expression approaches zero as Sg approaches D0 or B approaches zero.
Thus by choosing a sufficiently high Sg good banks may distinguish
themselves from bad banks. Whether good banks want to do this depends on the
difference between the pooling and separating rate premium on borrowing, and
the cost of holding loans rather than securities.
B. Solution of Model II
Model II extends Model I by assuming that banks begin period 0 with old
loans L1 of known quality, backed by deposits of D1/(l—e)=L1, where c is
the equity requirement. Returns on these loans aredistributed independently24
and identically to L0, so that high or low interest is paid only in periods 1
and 2. A fraction of principal, *1, is also repaid in period 1 with the
balance of principal repaid in period 2. We assume that withdrawals at time
1 are sufficiently large so that old loans must be sold in the absence of
borrowing.14 Effectively there are eight types of banks; the original four
types combined with two possibilities for old loan quality. The bank profit
function corresponding to (4) is:







Despite the increased multiplicity of types, the period 1 borrowing game
is almost identical. The exceptions are that (1) the equilibrium markup over
the riskfree rate is conditional on security holding, and (2) only
"good/good/bads" (good period -1 and period 0 loans, bad deposit
realization) will be willing to borrow at a premium to avoid sellingloans15.
To find equilibrium borrowing, we follow the procedure described in Section
III. First reservation rate schedules as a function of borrowing are
calculated for each type, conditional on their earlier choice of S0 and L0
and belief about the discount c. Then fair pooling rate schedules for
investors are calculated. Combining the information in these schedules, we
find a candidate equilibrium schedule along which banks would be willing to
borrow and investors willing to lend. From this schedule, one can prove as25
in Theorem 1 that the point that maximizes expected profits for the
good/good/bads yields the debt market equilibrium.
Once equilibrium borrowing as a function of S0 and L0 is determined, the
optimal S0 and L0 can be found as a function of old loan quality as follows.
First compute expected time 0 profit for both types as a function of S0 when
both types hold so that there is pooling in the debt market. Call these
profit schedules gi(S) and bl(S). Then compute expected profits as a
function of S0 for banks with good old loans, assuming those with bad period
-l loans hold no securities. Call these profit schedules g25 and
Theorem 2: A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a
separating equilibrium is an S*, 0 < S* < D0, such that
a) g2*) > max gl for (S: IT'bl(S) >
b) b2
Proof: (Necessity) Assume (b) fails. Then if goods choose S* in equilibrium,
bads will also since mimicking has a higher expected value than autonomy.
Assume (a) fails. Then goods would profit by instead choosing max
over S b2 resulting in pooling.
(Sufficiency) Both goods and bads know these expected profit schedules at
time 0. If (a) and (b) hold, a good bank knows that no bad bank would choose
to hold S*, so that at time 1 if the good bank borrows it will only be pooled
with other ex ante good banks. Thus the expected profit from choosing S* is
By (a), this is preferred to any of the pooling outcomes. Since
bads know tthat goods will choose S*, they choose S-.O for an expected profit
b226
A numerical implementation of the above algorithm provides many examples
of separating equilibria. A representative example is given in Table 2 in
the appendix. However, pooling equilibria can also be found for some
parameters. Separation is most likely to occur when a relatively large
amountofborrowing is necessary, and when many banks with bad period -l
loans find it advantageous to borrow although their old loans drive them
close to bankruptcy.
VI. Conclusion
This paper explores the influence of asymmetric information on banks'
portfolio choice and liability decisions. We demonstrate that holding a
portion of the bank's portfolio in risk-free securities may be optimal even
though banks are risk neutral and receive insurance that induces risk
preference. An optimal portfolio can include securities because they signal
asset quality, mitigating the cost of asymmetric information. However,
securities are not a perfect signal, and outside borrowing still costs a
premium over the full-information rate for banks with good assets but a poor
liquidity realization. Securities serve as a signal of asset quality because
it is more costly for banks with poor assets to lower variance than for banks
with good assets. This should be true in the risk-averse case as well. An
interesting implication of the model is that banks holding relatively more
securities have higher quality assets on average, and hence a lower failure
rate.
The model is novel in several respects. First, although the rationale
for holding securities is familiar from the transactions cost literature, the27
cost in this model is endogenously determined and linked directly to the
degree of informational asymmetries. Second, the model highlights an unusual
kind of maturity mismatch which might be described as "information mismatch".
Usually, maturity mismatch refers to interest rate risk arising from unequal
payment streams between twosecurities.In this model, however, the risk
arising from mismatched securities arises from asymmetric information that
limits the ability to sell assets of longer maturity at a fair price. Thus,
one-period demand deposits are informationally matched against two-period
riskiess securities, but mismatched against two-period loans. A similar
analysis might explain firms' tendency to issue securities with maturity
equal to the project being financed.
In this model banks can only issue subordinated debt as an alternative
to loan sales, but of course banks also can and do issue equity and straight
debt. An interesting extension to this model would be to price equity and
debt, and determine under what conditions one form of financing dominates
another.28
Appendix
Reservation borrowing schedules for Model I:
0 riskfree with or without borrowing
(10) Egg(B) —aH
-r risky with or without borrowing
[(LO(l-1.aH)+SO(l+r)+BrDO&L))(l÷aH)(DO+B&L)(l+r)]/B -
[LO(l°)(l+aH)+(SO(l+r)+LO(°÷aH)
-rD -6 )(l+r) -
(l+r)(Do&L)
riskfree without, risky with borrowing







Proof of Lemma 2: First we eliminate the possibility that correctly
identified banks ("one-pools") will issue debt. We consider separately the
cases where banks are risky at B—0 as opposed to riskless. Imagine that a
good/good or bad/good is risky at B=0, borrows B and buys new loans with the
money. The expected return on the borrowing is fB[(l+aH)(l+r+s)], so
borrowing will only be undertaken if s <aHr.
Let P(0) denote profits at
zero borrowing. If new loans turn out to be bad, lenders receive
P(0) +(l+aL)B<(l+aL)B
where the inequality follows because by assumption P(0) < 0. This occurs
with probability (1-f). Thus when the loans are good, a return of greater
than l+QH is required in order for the expected return to equal l+r. This
implies s >
aH
-r,so there is no borrowing.29
If on the other hand good/goods are initially riskfree, then FDIC
insurance has no value, and increasing risk through borrowing cannot affect
the value of FDIC insurance when the debt is subordinated. Thus, if the debt
is fairly priced the bank is indifferent to borrowing, and hence by
assumption doesn' t.
If good/goods and bad/goods do not borrow by themselves, a two-pool is
also impossible. The good/goods are driven out because the borrowing rate
for the two-pool must be higher than the rate for a one pool with just
good/goods. Finally consider the good/bads. If they borrow slightly more
than that necessary to avoid loan sales, they are riskfree and therefore
would accept no positive premium. As borrowing increases, risk increases for
the bank but not for the FDIC, which is always entirely repaid. As for
good/goods who are riskfree at B-O, good/bads are indifferent between
borrowing and not borrowing in a one-pool because no risk can be transferre4.
Proof of Lemma 3: Let w. be the fraction of secondary market loans issued by
a bank of type i (where i denotes information learned in period 1 concerning
loan returns and deposit flows), with Q. being the loan liquidations for a
type i bank. The condition for secondary market loans to be fairly priced is
(A.3.1) E0[Q.(1+cz?)] (l-c)E0Q.
Assume that the bank is all-equity financed at period 0. The value of the
bank in period 2 is30
(A. 3.2) V2= max[0,
Q and B are chosen by the bank conditional on time 1 information. Let I be an
indicator function such that I —0when the bank is bankrupt and I 1
01
otherwise. Let F(x) be the joint distribution function for x—(&,a ,a ). Then
actuarial fairness for debt-holders implies that
(A.3.3) J'(l+r-4-)B dF(x) +f(1+r+s)BdF(x) —(l+r)B
1—0 I—i
whereis the realized random premium on debt which depends on x. The value
of equity in period 0 can be written
V0 —2[1I1(1+&°)(l-°)L+(1+&1)dF(x) +1I1(1+&')(1-c)-Q(l+&°) dF(x)
(A.3.4) -1-1I1(l+&1)-(1+r+s) dF(x)
Using the fact that debtholders own the firm in the event of bankruptcy,
(A.3.3) and (A.3.4) together imply
(A.3.5) V0 —fl2[f(l+&°)(1-°)L0+(1+&iAdF(x) +f(1+)Q(l-c)-(l+&°)dF(x)]
(A.3.1) and equation (1) in the text imply that the term involving Q is zero.
Evaluating the first term (recall that A contains S0) gives V0L0 +S0
-
E0(&),
which is independent of Q and B, and of the breakdown between L0 and S0.
Finally, note that all investors are risk-neutral and symmetrically
informed in period 0, so the Modigliani-Miller theorem implies that the value
of the bank is not affected by its debt-equity ratio in period 0.31
Table 1: Parameter Values Yielding Positive Security Holdings
When Borrowing is Prohibited
(Fixed Parameters: —10.,r —.03,0 =.1,£— .05)
1.7 to 3.8
6L -100. to -8.5
aH
.05 to .13
f .6 to .9
g .45 to .75
Note: Not all combinations will yield positive security holdings.
aL and c are determined endogenously given these values.
Table 2.Parameters Generating a Separating Equilibrium
Parameters:
£".OS, D0—10., L1—12., 6H18' 6L6'
r—.03, aH_.O9, aL_ .08, f-.65, g—.5, 0...l
Equilibrium Portfolio and Borrowing:
S0—2.6L0—7.875s=.02B=12.
Types borrowing in equilibrium: good/good/bad, good/bad/good,
and good/bad/bad.
The simulation programs are available from the authors upon request.32
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FOOTNOTES
1. Some mechanisms exist to alleviate the problem of informational
asymmetry. To take one recent example, REMICs (Real Estate Mortgage
Investment Conduits) allow banks to sell mortgages, separated into junior and
senior claims. One would expect that by selling the senior claims and
retaining the junior claims, banks would face a smaller lemons discount when
selling these claims in the secondary market. We have also been told that
some resold credit card receivables are selected by an audited randomization
procedure. Nevertheless, such mechanisms are unlikely to completely
eliminate the lemons problem, since banks with poorer assets are likelier to
enter these markets in the first place.
2. Many off balance sheet activities such as swaps, futures, backup lines of
credit, and foreign exchange trading have the potential to increase the
riskiness of a bank's portfolio.
3. Banks by law cannot hold certain risky assets. For example, the Glass-
Steagell act prohibits holdings of corporate equity. Also, regulatory
pressure presumably can influence asset choice.
4. The ,6 terms provide an extra degree of freedom by allowing the fraction
of loans repaid early to vary. Since ÷￿0,for aL <0,we need .,b >0.
5. The assumption that uncertainty is resolved completely is made for
simplicity. The same conclusions would follow if the bank still faced some
uncertainty about loan quality, but less than the market.
6. Here we use the fact that it is optimal to invest solely in loans the
final period. Because the bank is liquidated in period 2, securities merely
reduce the value of insurance, without providing liquidity.
7. Allowing the bank to pay dividends complicates the analysis since it is
then necessary to model the equity constraint to put a limit on dividends.
For a derivation of results in this kind of model, see Lucas and McDonald
(1987).
8. If investors knew 6, this would change the interest rate on uninsured
bank debt because it would change their inference about who was borrowing.
9. When straight debt is issued, the equity requirement necessitates raising
new equity. This complicates the analysis, because the new equity also must
be priced. Generally we expect banks to prefer debt to equity for two
reasons in this model. Increased equity reduces the value of FDIC insurance,
while the affect of non-subordinated debt generally is to increase it.
Secondly, poorer batks are more likely to participate in a pooling
equilibrium with equity than with debt, so the lemons cost of equity tends to
be higher. This is similar to the findings of Myers and Majiuf. In
particular, it can be shown in our model that good/good banks never would
issue equity.35
Borrowing at the discount window is another alternative to loan sales.
In practice this does not appear to be an unlimited source of funds, so
uninsured security issues can still be necessary.
10. If banks with good loans could signal their quality, then c would be a
premium rather than a discount for these banks.
11. The equilibrium is sensitive to whether or not loan sales are observable.
When loan sales are observable, good banks may be able to signal their
quality by their restraint in loan sales, and sell some loans costlessly.
Thus a separating equilibrium may obtain in which the informational asymmetry
is costless for the good/bad banks. This is a much more complicated problem
than the unobservable case.
12.In the simulations the possibility that bad/bads also would choose to
borrow is accounted for. However, unless equity is large relative to the
variability of loan quality, they can never profitably borrow.
13. This expression assumes that banks with bad loans in period 1 sell them.
The comparison with securities is even less favorable if banks do. not sell
bad loans in period 1. For convenience we also assumeis zero, but any ,b<l
provides a similar result.
14. Without this restriction there would be no need to buffer old loans from
sales.
15. It is possible that good/bad/bads or bad/good/bads also would be willing
to pay a premium to protect good loans. In fact they could potentially borrow
a small amount at the riskfree rate to avoid selling good loans if the bad
loans did not push them into insolvency. However, for the parameter values
yielding separating equilibria, both of these groups are bankrupt unless they
mimic the good/good/bads.